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Framing Rebellious Choices: 
The Case of the Palestinian National Movement 
Daniel Masters 
East Carolina University 
One way to understand the rapid resurgence of violence 
f or the Palestinian National Movement is by turning to a 
prospect theory model of decision-making . Prospect the-
ory explains that people make decisions based on their 
view of the alternatives in terms of gains or losses . Indi-
viduals tend to favor risky behavior when facing choices 
ove r losses , and risk averse behavior when facing 
choices over gains . This suggests that barriers to rebel-
lious collective action are not high because the certainty 
of a positive payoff is not necessary to induce people to 
participate . I explore this explanation by drawing upon 
evidence gathered through interviews with supporters of 
Palestinian rebellions . The evidence provides some in-
sight into the recent violence in the Occupied Territories 
by probing issues relating to framing of rebellious deci -
sions . 
The recent uprising, or al-Aqsa Intifada, in the West Barne and Gaza is a reminder of the collective action problem 
and rebellion. More specifically, why would Palestinians, 
who had previously demobilized from the Jabalya Intifada 
(1987-1993) in favor of the Oslo Accords, remobilize for a new 
intifada that is much more violent than in the past? What can 
account for the willingness of Palestinians to take actions that 
would directly affect their individual security with no foresee-
able payoff? The current debate regarding collective mobili:za-
tion tends to revolve around rational choice perspectives defined, 
in part, by Resource Mobili:zation, as well as social psychologi-
cal perspectives defined here by Framing Theory. Both perspec-
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
VOLUME 31 2003 PAGES 1-34 
2 MASTERS 
tives provide insight into the factors that move an otherwise qui-
escent population towards high-risk collective action. As sepa-
rate explanations, however, they are incomplete and speak past 
each other. Furthermore, the way the individual is currently cast 
by the rational choice perspective, and generally accepted by 
sociological framing, will ultimately block any effort to provide 
a satisfactory combination of the two. This suggests that a new 
model of the individual may be useful for explaining the role of 
the individual, organization, and social conditions as they relate 
to mobilizing people for collective political violence. 
Prospect theory may provide a new model. Prospect theory is 
a contextually based model of decision-making that explains 
when individuals are more or less likely to accept risk. Prospect 
theory explains that people's decisions are shaped by their ten-
dency to view alternatives in terms of gains or losses. Individuals 
tend towards risky behavior when facing choices over losses, and 
risk adverse behavior when facing choices over gains. However, 
individual risk acceptance is not shaped strictly by the quality of 
conditions. Rather, one's subjective assessment on the probabil-
ity of failure for risky options is offset by a similarly subjective 
assessment that risky alternatives can negate perceived losses 
(Berejikian 1992, 654). More specifically, the barriers to rebel-
lious collective action are not insurmountable because the cer-
tainty of a positive payoff is not necessary for participation 
(Berejikian 1992, 654). 
I review the current debate between the rational choice and 
social psychology perspectives with the intent to demonstrate 
their existing strengths and weaknesses. Prospect theory is then 
presented as an alternative model of individuals' likelihood of 
accepting risk and an explanation for the relationship between 
individual actors, social conditions, and social movement organi-
zations. The remainder of the paper explores the Palestinian Na-
tional Movement as an illustrative case using prospect theory as 
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its orienting lens. The case study includes a review of history 
combined with interview data gathered from supporters of vio-
lent action within the Palestinian National Movement. 
THE TIIEORETICAL LANDSCAPE 
When studying social movements, one problem we invariably 
face is explaining the mobilization of latent groups towards col-
lective action. The problem is in attempting to explain two sepa-
rate phases of mobilization: (a) conditions that create the 
potential for collective action, and (b) transferring the potential 
for action into realized states of action. Overall mobilization 
theories have trouble trying to explain both ends of this process. 
For example, Framing Theory attempts to define social 
movements as the outcome of reality construction and communi-
cation processes (Benford 1997, 409). The term "frame" refers to 
an interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the 
world by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situa-
, tions, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one's 
present or past environment (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). The 
frame is a necessary condition for movement participation that 
works through efforts to link individuals (potential participants) 
and social movement organizations (mobilizing agents) by pro-
viding a set of individual level beliefs, values and interests that 
are "congruent and complimentary" with the goals and ideology 
of the organization (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Once the frame is 
constructed, the organization engages in micromobilization (ac-
tivities to advertise, promote, and diffuse the defined frame into 
society or a target group). Collective action results from a par-
ticular frame that accents or exaggerates problems within the 
social condition and defines those conditions as deserving a col-
lective response (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). As such, the 
collective action frame serves as a "mode of attribution" that will 
motivate people to take action (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). 
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It stands to reason then that in order for the frame to gain cur-
rency among potential participants there must be a set of under-
lying social conditions that approximate the framed conditions. 
Therefore, at the heart of Framing Theory is an assumption that 
social conditions matter to the mobilization process. Social con-
ditions are the source of grievances that are defined and articu-
lated by the frame. The grievance can, and will, be subjectively 
interpreted to reflect the socio-political actor's perception of re-
ality, and the goals defined by the collective action solution will 
reflect the actor's interpretation of how reality should look. In 
other words, through framing we define the current world and 
seek to affect a different interpretation of reality (Benford 1997, 
410). 
"How we move from poor social conditions to collective ac-
tion?" remains an unanswered question. Framing Theory does 
explain the various means by which perceptions of reality are 
defined, and how those perceptions can be couched to define a 
need for collective action. What, however, is the primary catalyst 
that converts a potential for action to the realization of action? 
Framing Theory does not attempt to answer this question di-
rectly. Instead, it explains the surrounding conditions, how they 
are ( or should be) perceived, leading to the assumption that if the 
frame is accepted that it will create an emotional response among 
the target group that makes action possible. As such, Framing 
Theory is given credit for reintroducing ideas to social move-
ment studies (Oliver and Johnston 2000, 37). The exact impor-
tance of this contribution, however, is disputed 
Resource Mobilization is a form of collective action theory 
informed through Mancur Olson's ( 1965) Collective Action 
Model. At the heart of Collective Action is the assumption of 
actors defined by rational behavior (della Porta and Diani 1999, 
7) or Subjective Expected Utility. This assumption provides a 
model of the individual as a rational egoist that places a premium 
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on self-interest over the interests of the group. Because the actor 
tends to calculate costs and benefits of action based on self-
interest, with the intent of maximizing benefits, the tendency to 
"free ride" on the efforts of others is strong. As such, the primary 
goal of any group is to solve the free-rider problem. Olson 
( 1965) defined a set of solutions that involve providing exclusive 
benefits to movement participants. 
Resource mobilization adds to this discussion by elucidating 
specific tasks that social movement organizations engage in to 
affect action. The core argument is that high-risk collective ac-
tion requires resources (Khawaja 1995, 151; Loveman 1998, 
484). Organization is central as it provides a basic connection 
between people enabling the advancement of their goals. By 
connecting people through organization, they are better are posi-
tioned to pool and direct resources towards collective action 
(Lovemen 1998, 484). Collective action enables aggrieved peo-
ple to advance their goals. Conversely, aggrieved but unorgan-
ized people are less likely to be able to advance their own goals 
(Khawaja 1995, 151). The opportunity to engage in collective 
action is thus a function of available resources and organizational 
strength (Khawaja 1995, 152). 
The ability to gather and direct resources is certainly essential 
to any type of collective action. Resource Mobilization, though, 
explains the need for resources more specifically as a function of 
rational actors. That is to say, people behave in a rational way by 
following their interests. To engage in collective action, however, 
requires the pursuit of interests through the calculation of costs 
and benefits as shaped by resource availability and constraints on 
the ability to act (della Porta and Diani 1999,_ 7-8; McAdams, 
Tarrow and Tilly 200 I, 21 ). In short, mobilization for high-risk 
collective action is a function of resources that reduce the costs 
of action and enable the group to share incentives among partici-
pants ( della Porta and Diani 1999, 8). 
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When dissecting the Resource Mobilization position, it 
should be noted that Resource Mobilization speaks to two spe-
cific types of incentives to explain collective action. The first is 
what Mark Lichbach (1995, 48) refers to as a market solution to 
free riding, specifically increasing resources. One of the largest 
barriers to engaging in collective action is the ability of people to 
take action. The ability to act is detennined by available re-
sources. Potential rebels cannot act without equipment, or the 
means to obtain equipment. Thus, a person or group of people, 
without the means to engage in rebellion will be unable to do so. 
Through organization, the group can pool and distribute re-
sources among members in order to bring about action. In this 
way, the barrier to action (cost of participation) is reduced 
through the organization directing resources in such a way as to 
provide the equipment necessary, meaning that potential partici-
pants do not need to pay for their equipment out of pocket. The 
second type of incentive is a hierarchy solution to free riding, 
providing selective incentives (Lichbach I 995, 215). Since the 
benefit of rebellious action tends to be shared by all members of 
the target community equally, people will assess participation in 
tenns of personal costs that yield limited personal payoffs. As 
such, additional incentives are needed to motivate people to par-
ticipate. As Lichbach states, a dissident's self-interest prevents 
collective action and works against the rise of dissident move-
ments unless an exclusive benefit is offered to offset the personal 
costs of participation (1995, 216). 
Viewing the market and hierarchy solutions as one theory 
provides a clear and elegant explanation. However, if we disen-
tangle the hierarchy and market solution, Resource Mobilization 
runs into trouble. The trouble relates more directly to selective 
incentives than to increased resources. A solution to the collec-
tive action problem based on the need to supply exclusive bene-
fits to participants in order to enlist their support suggests that 
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one's narrowly defined self-interest will usually overwhelm the 
decision to accept risk. Moreover, the need for a positive payoff 
is necessary to mobilize potential participants. As stated above, 
this solution relies heavily on the assumptions of Subjective Ex-
pected Utility. Assumptions of particular interest are intransitiv-
ity (individual preferences are consistent across all contexts) and 
benefit maximization (the preference selected is chosen in order 
to maximize one's utility). The problem with these assumptions 
is that they are normative axioms that when tested in experimen-
tal settings are routinely violated. Being normative, Subjective 
Expected Utility axioms fail to explain accurately decision-
making behavior, and thus fail to hold any reliable predictive 
utility (McDermott 1998, 8). Concomitant to this, by accepting 
intransitivity and benefit maximization, we are forced to accept 
the conclusion that social conditions and efforts at framing are 
unnecessary, as context does not matter to an individual's deci-
sion to accept risk. Context may identify the need for action, but 
it does not matter to the mobilization effort. The question is "if 
context does not matter to risk acceptance, why do organizations 
engage in framing exercises?" 
Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory offers several advantages over the rational 
actor model. First, it provides an empirically based model of 
decision-making that defines the process as one where people are 
motivated more to avoid losses than to maximiz.e benefits 
(McDermott 1998, 7). Furthermore, the decision mechanics are 
understood as a process where evaluation of alternatives is 
influenced by how options are framed. This means the decision 
process falls prey to judgemental biases, and these biases can be 
manipulated by outside forces such as advisors, groups, etc. 
(McDermott 1998, 7-8). While the individual remains a self-
interested actor, the agent makes decisions within a dynamic 
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environment that constantly shapes and reshapes perceptions of 
alternatives. Though context shapes how individuals view 
options , the process is not overly complex. In fact, predictions of 
risk propensity are possible once we know the domain in which a 
decision is viewed . That is to say, if people view a decision as 
defined by a choice between gains, they are risk averse; if the 
decision is defined by a choice between losses, people are risk 
acceptant (Berejikian 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 
1992; McDermott 1998). 
Prospect theory explains the behavioral tendencies described 
above as related to three observations regarding decision 
processes . First , people are more sensitive to changes in position 
rather than in their overall position. However, the impact of the 
change diminishes as it grows large (Levy 2000, 194), 
commonly referred to as diminishing senstivity to increasing 
gains and losses. It suggests two things: (a) people define their 
condition on the basis of a reference point, which is the anchor 
for any decision; (b) as conditions change, people make 
judgements on the value of change based on the reference point. 
As we move further away from the reference point, the value of 
the change losses its impact. 1 
The reference point for decisions is important because it 
defines our interpretation of change, whereby the individual will 
assign a value to change as either a gain or a loss. Once a change 
is defined as gains or losses we observe that people will respond 
differently to options. People overvalue losses relative to gains 
of equal value (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 279; Levy 2000, 
I A common example used to demonstrate di~inishing sensitivity is to consider the value 
of a SI 00 gain. The gain of SI 00 typically means more if it talces a person from SO to 
$100 than if it takes them from $1,100 to Sl ,200. The increment of the change is the 
same, but its perceived value is different as the total asset position changes. The same 
holds for losses where the perceived value of loss decreases as the value of the loss in-
creases (unless the larger loss is intolerable). 
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194; Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 721 ). The evaluation of losses 
prompts a second observation regarding decisions: loss aversion, 
or the tendency among individuals to avoid risk when making 
choices between gains and risk acceptant when making choices 
between losses (Levy 2000, 195). 
The tendency to avoid losses when facing gains and to seek 
risk when facing losses implies value function for individuals 
that is S-shaped with a concave curve in the domain of gains and 
a steeper convex curve in the domain of losses (See Figure 1 ). 
Jack Levy (2000, 195) notes that experiements on decision-
making have demonstrated that this pattern of risk orientation 
(represented by the S-shaped value function) is consistent across 
a variety of individuals and situations. 
The assymetry of perceived gains and losses around the 
reference point demonstrated in the figure is important because it 
informs the decision process and one critical effect on choices: 
the systematic tendency reverse preferences. The tendency to 
reverse preferences raises the third observation regarding 
decisions: the "framing effect" in which the same decision can 
be framed in different ways leading to different chosen 
alternatives (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 164). Demonstrations 
of the framing effect can be found in numerous examples 
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). One example 
defines gains as a "survival" frame and losses as a "mortality" 
frame (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, S260). The situation is the 
U.S. preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been 
proposed to fight the disease. The estimates of the consequences 
for each program are as follows: 
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Figure I: Prospect Theory Value Function 
+Value 
Gaines Frame 
Loses Frame 
Source: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky ( 1979). "Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision-Making under Risk." Econo-
metrica 47(2) : 279 . 
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Survival Frame: 
• Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
• Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 
600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 chance that no 
people will be saved. 
Now consider the same exact situation but framed differently: 
Mortality Frame: 
• Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
• Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 
no one will die, and a 2/3 chance that 600 people 
will die. 
11 
In the survival frame, 72% (n = 152) of the subjects preferred 
choice "A" suggesting risk-averse tendencies. Cognitively indi-
viduals are drawn to the possibility to save 200 people with cer-
tainty over the gamble which could potentially save more people, 
but with a probability that none will live. In the mortality frame, 
78% (n = 155) of the subjects preferred choice "D" indicating 
risk acceptant tendencies. In this presentation, participants move 
away from choice "C" even though it is the same choice as "A." 
The difference lies in the way alternatives are framed-option 
"C" highlights 400 people who will die with certainty. 
Framing effects are related to the way options are presented, 
combined with norms, habits, and expectancies (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986). The norms and habits that affect decisions 
tend to be very idiosyncratic, but explainable through the editing 
and evaluation phases of the decision-making process. First, 
when presented with a decision, individuals engage processes to 
simplify the task by coding, combining, and canceling alterna-
tives, which narrows the number of options and defines those 
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options as gains or losses. 2 Second, once provided with a reason: 
able presentation of the decision (provided through our own in-
ternal editing or by outside actors) people tend to accept that 
formulation and generally will not attempt to recast the decision. 
This is important because it suggests that a person's view of a 
decision can be manipulated by the way the decision alternatives 
are cast. Third, people abstract the decision from other related 
factors to focus only on those outcomes that seem most relevant 
to the immediate problem while ignoring other related out-
comes. 3 Fourth, people attach value to change and specifically 
seek to avoid losses-meaning that we assess decision outcomes 
based on an anchor or reference point and the potential for 
change to or from the reference point. 4 
All of this matters in the decision-making task in that people 
are highly sensitive to changes in their environment or aspira-
tions on how that environment should look, and this sensitivity 
can greatly alter our ordering of preferences when making a de-
cision. As the ordering of preferences change, we note the alter-
natives people choose reflect more extreme responses to losses 
than to gains. As a result, preferences and the tendency towards 
' All these processes take place during the editing phase of a decision. Editing facilitates 
decision-making by highlighting certain options while discarding others. (For more in-
fonnation refer to McDennott 1998, or Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In the editing 
phase we observe that people engage in: Coding (sorting outcomes and defining them as 
gains or losses), combination (winnowing down prospects), and cancellation (throwing 
out extremely unlikely options). 
3 This refers to segregation , which can be important in that people may view a decision to 
rebel as related more exclusively to the outcome of independence for the national group, 
but ignore the related factors that it could result in death or imprisonment. In other words, 
they focus only on the specific outcome a decision is supposed to bring about, while 
ignoring all other possible outcomes. 
4 This refers to the evaluation phase where the framed prospects are assessed and the 
prospect with the highest value is chosen (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 255). The pros-
pect that holds the highest value is the one that can produce the greatest amount of 
change, with the value of change being shaped by loss adverse tendencies . 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
FRAMJNG REBELLIOUS CHOICES 13 
risk are not invariant across contexts. In behavioral terms, the 
assumptions of rational collective action are contradicted where 
narrow self-interest-defined by the effort to maximize bene-
fits-is consistent across all contexts. As such, the barriers to 
collective action remain high in all situations requiring groups to 
provide inducements in order to mobilize participants . By using 
prospect theory, we can now say that as context changes, the ten-
dency among people to accept risk changes, which lowers the 
barrier to collective action within situations defined by losses . 
Risky options become acceptable because they offer the possibil-
ity to escape certain losses not because of the perceived likeli-
hood of success associated with the option, or the provision of 
some other positive payoff. 
There are some final points to make regarding prospect 
• theory that are pertinent to social movements. First, evidence 
demonstrates that groups tend to escalate risky commitments 
more so than individuals (Kameda and Davis 1990; Whyte 
1993). Whyte (1993, 435) and Levi and Whyte (1997, 796) sug-
gest that when people are gathered into groups polarization proc-
esses dominate where majority positions favoring risk are 
magnified through discussions that expose all members to argu-
ments favoring that position. Polarization, combined with a ten-
dency to be perceived in a favorable light, creates a convergence 
condition where members of the group reflect the majority posi-
tion (Whyte 1993, 435). However, convergence and polarization 
are separate processes and one does not require the other in order 
for risk escalation to occur (Levi and Whyte 1997, 802; Whyte 
1993, 435). Some segments of the group may remain opposed to 
risk escalation, but simply abide by the decision of the group to 
avoid unnecessary confrontation (Levi and Whyte 1997, 802). 
An effort to avoid confrontation within the group does not sug-
gest that all members will accept risks equally. Some will sup-
port risky efforts but choose not to participate; others will oppose 
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risk altogether. These choices are explained in part by observed 
inaction biases where people may judge action as worse than 
inaction (Baron and Riot 1994, 4 77; Schweitzer 1994, 459). The 
inaction bias can manifest itself in the form of a perceived 
"tradeoff' where individuals assess forms of action as well as 
social conditions. As such, certain acts (rebellion) may be per-
ceived of as a loss relative to a default position (inaction) mean-
ing that some people will prefer the default position of inaction 
(Baron and Riot 1994, 479) . 
Prospect Theory and Rebellious Choices 
Prospect theory provides some interesting implications for 
rebellious choices. For instance, prospect theory would predict 
that if the status quo (subjectively,, perceived conditions) 
approximates (meets or exceeds) the reference point, people are 
in a gains frame. In a gains frame, individuals will not take the 
chance on a rebellion that may improve conditions since there is 
also a chance that conditions will get worse (sure gains over 
risky gains). Conversely, "if the reference point is not congruent 
with the status quo ... [it] is destabilizing and reinforces 
movement away from the status quo." (Levy 1997, 91). When 
reference points are not congruent with the status quo, people 
perceive the status quo in terms of losses. Hence individuals are 
more likely to accept rebellion even though there is a high 
chance of failure. 
The following illustration is useful here. In Palestine, groups 
such as Fateh, the Popular Front, Democratic Front, Islamic Ji-
had, and Hamas openly call for the creation of an independent 
Palestine. Independent means Palestinian lands liberated from 
Israeli control (the defined boundaries of the "liberated Pales-
tine" vary by group). The goal departs from the status quo (lim-
ited autonomy in Gaza and on 40% of the West Bank) granted 
during the peace process. The status quo conditions fall behind 
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the reference point defined by these groups-hence, a losses 
frame. The decision facing Palestinians then looks like this: first, 
accept the current conditions of limited autonomy on narrowly 
defined territory. Second, rebel with a likelihood that no change 
will occur but a chance that more land will be transferred and 
greater independence could be achieved. Prospect theory predicts 
that when this condition exists, risky options become more at-
tractive. 
The Palestinian example demonstrates the ways in which 
prospect theory can be used to understand rebellious choices in 
general. To grasp the nuances of how individual and group fram-
ing takes place requires fuller elaboration. Elaboration makes it 
apparent that prospect theory allows us to recast our understand-
ing of (rebellious) collective action while providing a conceptual 
bridge between Framing Theory and Resource Mobilization. 
To begin, I assume individual behavior is governed by pros-
pect theory. As such, actors are motivated to avoid losses and 
accept greater amounts of risk in order to avoid losses. To ex-
plain the rise of social movements (rebellion in particular) re-
quires that a perception of loss exists based upon some 
identifiable reference point. The perception of loss can be manu-
factured or manipulated by groups, but in order to gain any cur-
rency, the presented frame for the rebellious choice must be (in 
some way) consistent with conditions perceived by group mem-
bers. Thus, the task is to explain how such perceptions would 
emerge within individuals, transfer to groups, and what role the 
organization will play in framing prospects and mobilizing peo-
ple for rebellion. 
The existence of perceived losses among members of the na-
tionalist community begins at the individual level. Individual 
perceptions derive from one's experience with conflict, socializa-
tion, and the impact of historical incidents. Experience with con-
flict refers to the degree to which individuals are directly affected 
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by the conditions associated with some form of personal or 
group subjugation. Conditions like concentrated poverty, housing 
discrimination, and suppression through arbitrary arrest bring 
awareness to individuals that they are in conflict with another 
group. Awareness of the conflict further suggests that current 
conditions represent a loss when compared to an idealized no-
conflict condition. Socialization refers to the role of families in 
influencing people's perception of losses. Families that have a 
history of support for rebel activity are more likely to teach chil-
dren lessons that highlight perceived losses and support for re-
bellious activity. Finally, historical events, such as massacres, 
have the tendency to mobilize large numbers of people into ac-
tion. These events temporarily intensify the losses frame, thereby 
increasing the number of people willing to accept risk. 
When the experiences and perceptions discussed above are 
concentrated among individuals that share common links to a 
solidary group it is likely to generate group perceptions. Special-
ized groups occur when individuals perceive themselves to be 
members of an imagined community leading to the social con-
struction of "we" and to the emergence of group interests (Hall 
1993, 50-51; Tilly 1978b, 63). Threats to group interests will 
then provoke group responses, not individual responses. This is 
particularly relevant when the basis of the solidary group is na-
tional or ethnic identity. Such cultural identities create stronger, 
more enduring, linkages between individuals (Gurr 1996, 63; 
Tilley 1978b, 63). Cultural groups that experience shared griev-
ances are likely to galvanize, making mobilization easier (Gurr 
1996, 63). Thus, when a solidary group exists, the potential for 
organized group response to perceived losses increases (Tilly 
1978b, 64). However, increased potential does not mean that re-
bellious choices will necessarily be defined or acted upon. In 
essence, the potential for organized group action is greater, but 
not certain. More specifically, when losses are concentrated 
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among members of the solidary group, we see the emergence of 
a "constituent community" that entrepreneurs can draw upon to 
organize for collective action. 
Experience, perceptions of poor conditions, and group cohe-
sion are necessary but not sufficient to provoke a rebellious ac-
tion. These factors do not provide unity or direction to the 
dissatisfied masses. Thus, the perceptions of loss remain "un-
framed" in terms of rebellious choices. To move from dissatis-
fied masses to collective action requires organization. This is 
where Framing Theory and Resource Mobilization contribute to 
our understanding of the mobilization process. Framing Theory 
informs us about the tasks organizations undertake in order to 
construct a worldview among individuals. The worldview will 
(a) frame the individual level experiences within the context of 
group experiences, which are related to the social condition (i.e. 
assign responsibility for individual level experiences); and (b) 
frame the decision for individuals as one where people can ac-
cept the current conditions (defined as a sure loss) or engage in 
some form of collective action to escape those losses (gamble for 
improved conditions).5 The organizational framing of conditions 
(i.e. micromobilization effort) is then used to define a course of 
action needed to reconstruct a reality coherent with the ideology 
or goals of the organization. Resource Mobilization adds to this 
5 It is necessary to understand that presenting the choice as between sure losses and a 
gamble for improvement implies that the risk associated with the gamble could result in a 
worsening of social conditions . In the intermediate phases of any collective action (par-
ticularly rebellion) , social conditions will worsen before they improve . As such, we 
should consider degrading social conditions within the context of prospect theory 
whereby the decision to take action is segregated from other relevant outcomes . Conse-
quently , degrading social conditions are not likely to act as a barrier to future action . 
Instead , they are likely to be integrated in to the existing losses frame . As such, Israeli 
military actions to the Intifada are not likely to be viewed as a response so much . Rather , 
Palestinians are likely to view the actions as a continuation of losses-a continuation of 
present conditions . 
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rected to the identification of important points that shape goals 
and aspirations of Palestinian political groups currently active in 
the national movement. Second is a review of interview data 
gathered from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The data 
are used to identify individual level reference points, the frame 
for a decision to support rebellious activity, and the framing ef-
fect (i.e., isolating the biases within the decision process) that led 
people to support rebellion in the past. The data were collected in 
the summer of 1999 prior to the onset of the recent violence. The 
data provides insights on past rebellious activity. At the same 
time, the interviews were finished thirteen months prior to the 
onset of the current wave of violence. As such, the data provide 
some useful insights to the recent violence. However, given the 
amount of time that passed between the interviews and the vio-
lence, we cannot rely on the data as a predictor for that violence; 
rather it is insightful, not detenninistic. 
There were 39 respondents6 selected through a non-
probability design referred to as a convenience sample using a 
"snowballing" technique. A snowball technique relies on what-
ever sampling units (in this case individuals) are conveniently 
available (Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 175), expanding from 
those units to others based on referrals made to the researcher. 
The sampling technique is a compromise made to accommodate 
the need for trust between the researcher and respondents, and 
reflects a certain reality that it is impossible to gather a random 
sample of people that support or engage in rebellious activity. As 
• The sample includes 34 mak-s and 5 females. 37 people with or receiving a collegt: 
education and 2 without a collt:gc education , 21 people that hold professional level jobs 
and 18 \~ith manual labor jobs , 36 people proclaiming affiliation with the dominant reli-
gious group tls lam) and 3 proclaiming affiliation with the non-dominant religious group 
tChrist ian). Finally, 28 respondents identify with the dominant national group (Palestin-
ian-Arab) , while 11 proclaim affiliation with a non-<lommant nallonal group (Arnb, or 
Arnb-Palcstiniun ). 
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by explaining the specific tasks organizations engage in to mobi-
lize people to take action. The organization provides a communi-
cative framework that metes out the frame for a rebellious 
decision and presents that decision to the individuals in the 
community. Furthermore, by drawing individuals into the or-
ganization resources are gathered (labor, money, and other mate-
rial resources), which are then directed towards the collective 
action effort. The key point to remember with prospect theory is 
that people are already predisposed to accept risk; therefore, the 
group will need to expend little if any resources to induce people 
to take action. Rather resources are directed more specifically to 
enable action. 
In sum, a prospect theory model of (rebellious) collective ac-
tion provides an explanation whereby rebellious decisions are 
molded by social conditions. The ability to mobilize remains 
limited unless an organization can inspire people within the tar-
get community to rebel. To do this the rebel group must engage 
in the process of framing, as described by Framing Theory, with 
the intent of presenting the decision to rebel as a choice between 
two losses: one certain, the other probable. In conjunction with 
framing rebellious choices the rebel group enables collective 
action by providing a communicative framework, gathering re-
sources, and directing the resources towards collective action. 
APPL YING PROSPECT THEORY: 
THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
Prospect theory explains that risk propensity is related to in-
dividuals' perceptions of alternatives as shaped by their context. 
Application of prospect theory is cumbersome, since it requires a 
description of conditions and how those conditions relate to de-
cisions about collective action. To apply prospect theory to the 
Palestinian National Movement, I have turned to two sources of 
information. First is a brief review of the historical conflict, di-
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such, the data do not allow for generalizations to the broader 
population or other cases. Instead, the data are used to deepen 
the context of the case study to demonstrate the framin~ effect 
and how the framing effect relates to rebellious choices. Inter-
viewees identify themselves as supporters of various political 
groups in the National Movement that have supported the use of 
violence in the past (e.g. Fateh, Hamas, DFLP, PFLP, lslamic 
Jihad). Interviewees defined themselves as: (a) activists, in-
volved in military operations (n = 21 ); (b) active supporters pro-
viding logistical support to military operations (n = 10); or (c) 
passive supporters (n = 8), offering passive resistance to Israeli 
Occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. 8 
Historical Background 
Four points in history are necessary to understand the context 
for the PNM and the current Al-Aqsa Intifada . First is the World 
War I settlement where the decision by Britain and France to 
divide Arab lands into a series of Mandates, combined with Brit-
ain's decision to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine, 
forged a Palestinian identity as separate from other Arabs by way 
of the new boundary and as a group in conflict with European 
7 In the interest of full disclosure of the interview process , readers should be aware of the 
possible points of unintended bias . These unintended biases relate to specific issues of 
data collection through face-to-face interviews and could have implications for validity . 
The validity issues are of less importance here simply because the data are not heing 
presented as a hypothesis test, rather as an illustrative case . Nonetheless , they must be 
included . The interviews lasted (on average) two hours . All interviews were taped , with 
the exception of one where the interviewee did not feel comfortable with taping ; hand-
written notes were used, instead . All interviews were conducted in private in a set1ing 
determined by the interviewee . The only exceptions were in cases where tr.mslators were 
needed . The interviewee provided the translator when needed . 
8 Variations in level of support are ascertained in relation to other elements in a broader 
study on rebellious choices . While there is potentially interesting information related to 
how people in different levels of support varied in their perceptions of gains and losses , 
the nuances of the differences are not within the scope of the present study . 
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immigrants. The second point is the 1948 War, which created 
Israel; meanwhile Palestine effectively disappeared as the land 
was divided between Israel, Egypt, and· Jordan. The creation of 
Israel and the disappearance of Palestine shaped the dominant 
goal of the early Palestinian National Movement: "The Return" 
to reclaim all of historical Palestine. The 1967 and 1973 Wars 
must be understood as a whole in terms of the impact on the con-
flict. The "Six Day War" of 1967 placed Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip under the direct military occupation of the 
Israeli Defense Forces. As a result, Palestinians began to per-
ceive their situation as defined by displacement and military oc-
cupation. The 1973 War is a point where some Palestinian 
groups redefined their goals. Specifically, Fateh and the DFLP 
articulated and circulated a two state solution-Israel within its 
pre-1967 boundaries, and Palestine on the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. The two-state solution drove a wedge into the Palestinian 
National Movement with the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine creating the "Rejectionist Front" to oppose the two-
state solution to focus on the goals of"The Return." 
The third and fourth points were the Jabalya Intifada (1987-
93) and the Oslo Peace Process, respectively. They introduced a 
number of important factors. First, the uprising signaled a 
wholesale rejection of occupation. All segments of Palestinian 
society were mobilized for this uprising, indicating a problem for 
Israel in its efforts towards "benign occupation." Second, ex-
tremist Muslim groups emerged as important actors. Islamic Ji-
had and Harnas surfaced prior to, and during, the intifada to 
assume an active military role for Muslim groups. These groups 
identified an alternative path to national liberation through the 
reclamation of Palestinian lands and rule under Islamic law. The 
Islamic groups further divided the Palestinian people by support-
ing "The Return" goal (rejecting the two-state solution) and sup-
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porting the formation of a religious state (rejecting the secularist 
position of Fateh, DFLP, and the PFLP). 
The Oslo Peace Process, both as an event and process, is im-
portant for setting in motion Israel's effort to press forward with 
the two-state solution. The Israeli version of two states gives 
Palestinians limited home rule in restricted areas and cities to 
establish a government structure and system of administration as 
intermediate steps to full statehood. The creation of two states 
would take place through negotiations to resolve (primarily) 
boundary issues . In effect, Oslo lends strength to groups that 
changed their goals to support two states. At the same time, Oslo 
can be perceived as an attempt to pitch Palestinians into a gains 
frame, thereby provoking risk adverse behavior, which would 
undermine support for the activities of Islamic groups. 
The historical information provides us a few important pieces 
of information: it defines the group targeted for collective mobi-
lization, the universe of goals for many of the mobilized groups 
in the Palestinian National Movement, and the place of the Oslo 
Peace Process as an effort to pitch Palestinians into a gains frame 
making people more likely to reject risk (i.e., end the Intifada 
and the increasing violence by Islamic groups). The interview 
data provided below is designed to demonstrate bow this infor-
mation is reflected among those interviewed in order to explain 
how decisions to rebel (in the past) were framed. At the same 
time, it offers a chance to understand why the current intifada 
erupted. 
A. REFERENCE POINT ESTIMATION AND 
FRAME OF REFERENCE 
To define a reference point interviewees were asked, "Could 
you define the goals of the group you support?" From this ques-
tion, evidence demonstrates there are many different groups, 
none of which is completely dominant. The absence of dominat-
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ing views indicates that there are many different reference 
points. Despite this, all groups focused their primary attacks 
against Israel, indicating the possible existence of a core refer-
ence point modified by the specific goals of the different groups. 
In fact, all respondents spoke of a single issue that could serve as 
the reference point of Palestinians-a liberated Palestine. Be-
yond the issue of national Liberation, respondents provided de-
tails relating to visions of a liberated Palestine. The following 
comments provide examples of the differing perspectives : 
"Fateh is not an ideological party or movement. This 
group is not related to religion or ideology. It is a 
movement for national liberation, to bring back our 
identity . National liberation is the first and only goal 
right now." (03) 
"[For the DFLP] the main goal is the freedom of Pal-
estine. But we also have future goals about how we 
should live and solve problems . . . we see one country 
in all of Palestine, one country-one people, Jewish or 
otherwise." (05) 
" [For the Islamic Groups] one of the main goals is to 
worship one god. Palestine has a special condition; 
the Israelis occupy us. If we are to worship one God, 
we need peace. So we seek to bring back the land to 
the Palestinian people under our religion. This land is 
only for the people that believe in God." (08) 
The primary goal of liberation is consistent for all respon-
dents from all groups, even for those individuals who do not 
pledge support for any specific group (preferring to support the 
Palestinian National Movement as a whole). 
Using the stated goals as an indicator of a reference point, in-
dividuals were asked to assess the past conditions (prior to Oslo) 
in relation to their goals. All respondents stated that past condi-
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tions fell short of their goals (i.e., the reference point). Therefore, 
individuals perceive previous conditions as incongruent with the 
reference point, thus indicating a perception of losses. 
To assess perceptions relating to the 1999 conditions (post 
Oslo), interviewees were asked, "Do you feel the Oslo Accords 
brought your group closer to realizing its goals?" The responses 
to this question indicate that perceived losses among individuals 
did not diminish in the face of the peace process. The majority of 
respondents provide comments similar to the following: 
"Oslo actually sacrificed part of historical Palestine. 
It legitimized Israeli supremacy and terrorism over 
the occupied lands. Oslo also aimed to legitimize the 
historical claims of Zionism by distinguishing the re-
ality of Israel, while also promoting the view that AI-
abs were not equal to the Jews." (01) 
"It is the minimum for our ambition. It frees about I 
million people. But there are still 3 million in the 
West Bank, one million inside the green line, 6 mil-
lion in the diaspora. This is the main problem. Most 
of our people are still in the diaspora. Until we find a 
solution to this we are not finished." (04) 
"Our objective has not been achieved. It will take 
time and we will have to be very careful. But as far as 
Oslo is concerned, it does not bring me closer to my 
goals. It has taken me further away." (21) 
"Its relation to the struggle is minimal. How could Is-
rael end the Intifada? By tying the PLO away from its 
political coalition and making it responsible to Israel 
for Israeli security. They do this through Oslo." (29) 
Among the 39 respondents, only seven believe the Oslo Proc-
ess is a step in the right direction. These respondents, however, 
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acknowledge that Oslo's advantage is that it puts an end to vio-
lence, not to the conflict. The following comments best demon-
strate this point: 
"It has created changes in the political conditions. In 
the beginning it was the anned struggle and now it is 
not. For me the armed struggle is not the way now. 
We should try the peace _process to achieve our 
goals." (07) 
"Oslo is a beginning. We have reached this point to 
end the fighting. We are moving into a new phase. 
There was a need to put an end to the anned conflict 
on the ground. This kind of conflict could not achieve 
its goals. A conflict between two 'states' will be eas-
ier to conduct." (03) 
In sum, individuals identify a reference point that is incon-
gruent with their perceptions of the status quo conditions-hence 
a losses frame. The perceptions of loss remain strong among the 
majority of respondents (82.1 %) notwithstanding the ongoing 
peace process. The few respondents (17.9%) that acknowledge 
change stemming from the peace processes suggest that change 
bas taken the form of altering the conduct of the conflict, not 
resolving the issues of the conflict. Consequently, when asked, 
"Are you less likely to support armed resistance today given the 
signing of the Oslo Accords?" the majority of the respondents 
(92.3%) indicate that they will continue to support armed strug-
gle if a new round of violence erupts. Only three respondents 
state they would not support a continuation of violence. Among 
those indicating continued support, most made arguments that 
were consistent with the following comment: 
"[Israel] says the Palestinians now have their state 
and do not need to fight Israel. What they mean is 
that we should be happy. Barak is saying that this 
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Authority is the Palestinian State. But we are still un-
der the control of Israel. We have not gotten much. 
They still do not compensate us for the past, and we 
cannot ask for it because we are not independent. .. if 
we are to stick to this situation it will become a big 
problem for the Palestinians ." (05) 
B. THE FRAMING EFFECT 
The responses demonstrate that a losses frame was present 
among those interviewed. The perception of a losses frame ap-
pears to hold Qudging from the accounts of those interviewed) 
before Oslo, and has not changed since Oslo. The next task is to 
determine a framing bias that may have an impact on the deci-
sion to support armed struggle. To isolate the framing effect re-
quires that we first establish whether people believed losses were 
certain or transitory. Prospect theory suggests that when people 
believe the losses they face are certain, then risky options be-
come acceptable because they offer the possibility to escape 
losses altogether. 
To determine if the respondents believe losses to be certain, 
individuals were asked: "If you did not support the armed strug-
gle, in your opinion would conditions improve, remain the same, 
or get worse?" In response, all interviewees suggested they were 
convinced conditions would have stayed the same. Given that all 
respondents believe social conditions represent a loss, this find-
ing suggests they believe that past losses were certain. A few 
respondents indicated that in light of the entire struggle, condi-
tions would not change, but on a personal level they felt condi-
tions would be worse. None believed conditions would improve. 
Thus, certainty of existing losses is present among interviewees. 
Does perception of certain losses translate into a perception 
that rebellion could recover the losses? To answer the question, I 
draw upon three pieces of evidence: two from the interview data 
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and one from an empirical generalization on rebellious strate-
gies. First, individuals were asked: "Did you believe the armed 
struggle would lead to the creation of an independent Palestine?" 
Of the 39 respondents 25 (64 .1%) gave a firm "yes" to this ques-
tion. Nine respondents (23%) give a qualified "yes," stating the 
armed struggle was not the entire strategy, but was one tactic 
used within a larger political movement. Five (12.8%) indicate 
they did not believe the armed struggle would succeed. 
A belief in the possibility that a risky option can negate losses 
is suggestive of a framing effect, but it does not provide a firm 
demonstration of framing biases. The second piece of evidence is 
that historically, rebellion is unsuccessful. Most cases of rebel-
lion relying upon paramilitary tactics (as the Palestinian case 
does) fail within the first eighteen months (Gurr 1988, 35). The 
few that survive rarely succeed in bringing about change. By 
extrapolating from what is known about the likelihood for rebel 
success, and using this as a base line for assessing the likelihood 
that rebellion would succeed in the Palestinian case, we can 
safely assume that rebellion is a high-risk option. History sug-
gests that rebellion is likely to fail. 
Thus far, the evidence presented suggests that Palestinians did 
see rebellion as an option to escape losses, and that rebelJion is 
historically risky due to the low likelihood of success. The evi-
dence indicates that the chance for success may be low, based on 
historical precedent, but it does not suggest that rebellion will 
necessarily fail in this case. Perhaps the best evidence to suggest 
respondents opted for an obviously risky option comes from 
their own experiences. Most respondents (82.1 %) in this study 
suggest that in Palestine, the armed struggle has not achieved the 
goals it set out to-hence the persistence of perceived losses in 
the face of ongoing peace processes. Most respondents indicate 
that the peace accords fell well short of their goals, meaning that 
armed struggle did not achieve the ultimate goal of national lib-
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eration. Thus, in these cases we could say the armed struggle, to 
this point, has failed. Yet, an overwhelming majority of respon-
dents (92.3%) state they will continue to support violent action 
in the future. 
What does this evidence suggest in relation to prospect the-
ory? Recalling the discussion on prospect theory, groups con-
tinue in risky enterprises when facing losses even when those 
risks have failed in the past. The persistence of losses (even 
worsening conditions because of the rebellious action) is not 
likely to be perceived in terms of failed rebellious activity. In-
stead, past and future decisions to rebel are segregated from 
other outcomes, meaning that the decision to support armed 
struggle is assessed in relation to the goals of the group (i.e., na-
tional liberation) not necessarily in relation to past failure or 
worsening social conditions due to rebellion. 
In sum, risky actions in the past (rebellion) failed to achieve 
the goals set out by the Palestinian groups. The peace process 
begun in Madrid and continued in Oslo signaled the possibility 
for success stemming from the risky option-suggesting that a 
frame change towards gains was possible. Subsequent stalls in 
the peace process quickly undermined the possibility that a gains 
frame could spread throughout the Palestinian community. Pales-
tinians may have viewed Israeli efforts as a move to guarantee 
Israeli security at the expense of Palestinian independence. As 
such, perceptions of gains never spread and individual percep-
tions of persistent losses grew stronger. By the time the inter-
views were conducted (summer 1999), anger and resentment had 
grown strong, and people began to display romantic images of 
the Intifada, and call for a return to the armed struggle. For ex-
ample, 
"It [the Intifada] was a great thing. People took their 
lives into their own hands to fight the occupation" 
(23). 
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In sum, the perceived losses of Palestinians were not recov-
ered during the peace process, and a gains frame never devel-
oped. The absence of a gains frame is supported by public 
opinion polls conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communi -
cation Center (February 1999) where only 6.3% of Palestinians 
believed Oslo would result in peace and only 10.5% believed 
Oslo would bring about an independent Palestine. Therefore, the 
Palestinian choice continues to resemble a choice defined by op-
posing losses. The first option represents a certain loss-no 
change would occur through the existing peace process. Toe sec-
ond option entails a probable loss-resurgent rebellion resulting 
in a reverse of progress, but also provides the possibility that 
Israel would give greater concessions for Palestinian independ-
ence in their self-defined homeland. As prospect theory predicts, 
when facing a choice between two perceived losses, individuals 
are more likely to accept the risky option that holds the potential 
to escape losses altogether. This assessment is supported in part 
by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center polls (De-
cember 2000) where 69% of Palestinians believe the new Inti-
fada has increased Israel's willingness to accept Palestinian 
demands. 
FUTIJRE DIRECTIONS 
This study demonstrates how prospect theory can serve as an 
alternative model of decision-ma.king to explain how the indi-
vidual, social conditions, and social movement organizations 
relate to collective mobilization. Prospect theory offers an advan-
tage over Framing Theory and Resource Mobilization as separate 
explanations, by unifying them through the assumption of indi-
viduals as motivated to avoid or recover losses more than to 
maximize benefits. 
The Palestinian case study serves as an illustrative case dem-
onstrating how perceived losses would lead people to accept 
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greater amounts of risk and persist in risky ventures to avoid or 
recover perceived losses. This study was conducted primarily at 
the individual level. It defined reference points based on the his-
tory of the Palestinian National Movement ("The Return" and/or 
the Two-State Solution) and revealed how the different points of 
reference manifest themselves among those interviewed. The 
reference points then served as a standard of assessment for past 
conditions (prior to Oslo) and more recent conditions (post-Oslo, 
pre-al-Aqsa Intifada). The assessment demonstrates a consistent 
perception of loss among those interviewed, suggesting a strong 
predisposition for risky behavior. The interviewees suggest that 
the perception of existing losses was certain, and that rebellious 
action offered a chance to escape losses altogether. While social 
conditions may worsen because of rebellion, prospect theory 
tells us that the decision to engage in rebellion will not be 
viewed in these terms. Instead, the decision will be viewed in 
relation to the outcome of national liberation, while worsening 
conditions are likely to be integrated into existing perceptions of 
losses within the social condition. 
The study, while useful, is limited in many regards. First, the 
Palestinian case is presented to illustrate how rebellious choices 
are perceived. It does not serve as a test of hypotheses, or rival 
hypotheses. Therefore, further studies are needed to examine 
critically prospect theory at the individual level within rebellious 
situations . Second, the study is designed only to apply prospect 
theory at the individual level; therefore, it does not capture ele-
ments of the broader theory. Work still needs to be done to dem-
onstrate that groups actively engage in framing processes to 
mobilize people that may or may not be predisposed to accept 
risk. Such a study will also need to test rival hypotheses as 
well-especially those related to Resource Mobilization whereby 
the organization serves as a patron to induce people to join and 
engage in collective action. Other studies that may be of use in-
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elude Northern Ireland where the peace process has had relative 
success, or the Tamil case where a peace process has recently 
begun. Here a study could focus on how well a gains frame may 
have diffused into society to prevent a continuation of rebellious 
activity. It may be that people still perceive losses, but organiza-
tions previously engaged in rebellious action are now serving as 
barriers to further rebellious activity, a critical test of the claims 
made here. 
REFERENCES 
Baron, Jonathan and Ilana Ritov. I 994. "Reference Points and Omis-
sion Bias." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 59: 475-498. 
Benford, Robert D. 1997. "An Insider's Critique of the Social Move-
ment Framing Perspective." Sociological Inquiry 67(4): 409-
430. 
Berejikian, Jeffrey. 1992. "Revolutionary Collective Action and the 
Agent-Structure Problem." American Political Science Review 
86(3): 647-657. 
Della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario. 1999. Social Movements : An 
Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1996. "Minorities, Nationalities, and Ethnopolitical 
Conflict." In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and 
Pamela Aall eds. Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Re-
sponses to International Conflict. Washington DC: United 
States Institutes of Peace Press. 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1988. "Empirical Research on Political Terrorism: 
The State of the Art and How it Might be Improved ." In 
Robert 0 . Slater and Michael Stohl eds. Current Perspectives 
on International Terrorism. London: MacMillan Press. 
Hall, John A. 1993. "Ideas and the Social Sciences" in Judith Goldstein 
and Robert 0. Keohane eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Be-
liefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press. 
VOL. 31 2003 
32 MASTERS 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre. 2000 . "JMCC Public 
Opinion Poll Number 39 Part One On Palestinian Attitudes 
Towards Politics including the Current Intifada-December." 
Internet. 1 August 2002. Available URL jmcc.org/index.html. 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre and Tami Steinmetz Cen-
ter for Peace Research. 1999. "JMCC Public Opinion Poll 
Number 30 On Palestinian-Israeli Peace Index-February." 
Internet. 1 August 2002. Available URL jmcc.org/index.htrnl. 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre and Tami Steinmetz Cen-
ter for Peace Research . 1982. "The Psychology of Prefer-
ences." Scientific American 246: 160-173. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk." Econometrica 47(2): 263-
291. 
Kameda, Tatsuya and James H. Davis . 1990. "The Function of the Ref-
erence Point in Individual and Group Risk Decision Making." 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 46: 
55-76. 
Khawaja, Marwan. 1995. "The Dynamics of Local Collective Action in 
the West Bank: A Test of Rival Explanations." Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change. 44(1 ): 147-179. 
Levi, Ariel S. and Glen Whyte . 1997. "A Cross Cultural Exploration of 
the Reference Dependence of Crucial Group Decisions under 
Risk: Japan's 1941 Decision for War." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 41(6): 792-813. 
Levy, Jack S. 2000 . "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International 
Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory." In Manus I. 
Midlarsky ed. Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press. 
Levy, Jack S. 1997. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and Interna-
tional Relations." International Studies Quarterly 41(1): 87-
112. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
FRAMING REBELLIOUS CHOICF:S 33 
Levy, Jack S. 1992. "Prospect Theory and International Relations : 
Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems." Political 
Psychology 13(2): 283-309 . 
Lichbach, Mark. 1995. The Rebel's Dilemma . Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Loveman, Mara 1998. "High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Hu-
man Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina." American 
Journal of Sociology 104(2): 477-525. 
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of 
Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McDermott , Rose. 1998. Risk-Taking in International Relations: Pros-
pect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press. 
Nachmias, Chava Frankfort and David Nachmias . 1994. Research 
Methods in the Social Sciences, 4th ed. New York: St. Martin ' s 
Press . 
Oliver, Pamela E. and Hank Johnston. 2000. "What a Good Idea! Ide-
ologies and Frames in Social Movement Research." Mobiliza-
tion: An International Journal 5(1): 37-54. 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods 
and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Quattrone, George A. and Amos Tversky 1988. "Contrasting Rational 
and Psychological Analysis of Political Choice." American 
Political Science Review 82(3): 719-736. 
Schweitzer, Maurice. 1994. "Disentangling Status Quo and Omission 
Effects: An Experimental Analysis ." Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes 58: 457-476. 
Snow, David A. and Robert Benford. 1992. "Master Frames and Cycles 
of Protest." In Aldon D. Morris and Carola McClurg Mueller 
eds. Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
VOL. 31 2003 
34 MASTERS 
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochfrod, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and 
Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Process, Micro-
mobilization, and Movement Participation ." American Socio-
logical Review 51: 464-481. 
Tilly, Charles A. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. "The Framing of Deci-
sions and Psychology of Choice ." Science 211: 453-463. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1986. "Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions." Journal of Business 59(4): S251-S278. 
Tversky, Amos, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman. 1990. "The Causes 
of Preference Reversal." The American Economic Review 
80(1): 204-217. 
Whyte, Glen 1993. "Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group 
Decision-Making : A Prospect Theory Approach." Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes 54: 430-455. 
Zald, Mayer N. 2000. "Ideologically Structured Action: An Enlarged 
Agenda for Social Movement Research." Mobilization: An In-
ternational Journal 5(1): 1-16. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
